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Abstract
The sale of ideas (e.g. through licensing) facilitates vertical specialization and the di-
vision of labor between research and development. This specialization can improve the
overall efficiency of the innovative process. However, these gains depend on the timing
of the sale: the buyer of an idea should assume development at the stage at which he
has an efficiency advantage. We show that in an environment with asymmetric infor-
mation about the value of the idea and where this asymmetry decreases as the product
is developed, the seller of the idea may delay the sale to the more efficient firm, thus
incurring higher development costs. We obtain a condition for the equilibrium timing of
the sale and examine how factors such as the intensity of competition between potential
buyers influence it. Empirical analysis of licensing contracts signed between firms in the
pharmaceutical industry supports our theoretical predictions.
Jel Codes: L13, L24, L65, O32.
Keywords: Innovation, Licensing, Market structure, Bargaining, Pharmaceuticals,
Biotechnology.
1 Introduction
Innovation is undeniably an essential engine of growth. Whereas it has often been viewed,
particularly in the theoretical literature, as a “black box” inside a vertically integrated
firm, specialization in different phases of the innovation process is increasingly common in
many industries, such as the pharmaceutical, chemical and semiconductor sectors (Arora
et al. (2001)). This division of labor, facilitated by the growth of licensing markets that
allow for sale of ideas, potentially improves the efficiency of the innovative process.
We argue in this paper that these efficiency gains crucially depend on the timing
of exchange, by which we mean the phase of development at which the R&D project is
transferred from one firm to another. Consider two firms, one more efficient in conducting
early stage research and the other more efficient in the final stage. It is socially optimal to
have the relatively efficient firm own the idea at each stage, i.e. to transfer the invention
from the first to the second firm at the end of the initial stage. A delay in this transfer
increases the cost of innovating and might lead to the innovation being abandoned. The
innovation rate thus crucially depends on the timing of the transfer. We identify, both
theoretically and empirically, factors that may distort the timing of the transfer and
thus reduce the productivity of R&D. In particular, we explore the relationship between
market structure and the efficiency of markets for ideas.
To address this question, we build a general model of the sale of ideas in an envi-
ronment with asymmetric information that decreases over time. Specifically, we consider
a two period model involving one innovator and n potential buyers who compete on a
downstream market. Prior to the first period, the innovator has had an idea that requires
additional development to be brought to market. While she faces some positive cost of
development, development is costless for the buyers. It is thus socially optimal to transfer
the idea from the innovator to one of the buyers in the first period. However, the first
period is also characterized by asymmetric information: the innovator knows the value
of her invention, but the buyers are uncertain whether the idea is good. Development
efforts from the first to the second period reveal verifiable information about the value of
the idea and the buyer’s uncertainty is resolved prior to the start of the second period.
Since the sale of ideas usually involves bilateral negotiations, we use a sequential
bargaining setup (as in Stole & Zwiebel (1996), Smith & Thanassoulis (2007) and others).
The innovator bargains sequentially with the buyers over exclusive contracts. In general,
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incorporating asymmetric information in sequential bargaining models creates challenges.
In particular, the problem is typically characterized by a large multiplicity of equilibria,
making it difficult to draw general conclusions. One of the contributions of the paper is to
obtain testable implications in the context of such a model with asymmetric information.
Furthermore, these implications prove very robust to other model for the sale of ideas,
such as an auction.
We identify a condition for the contract to be signed in the first period. The key
tradeoff is the following: because the price of the idea in the first period reflects buyers’
uncertainty about its quality, an innovator who knows that her idea is good is tempted
to wait for information about the idea’s value to be revealed. However, she must incur
development costs to provide such information. An agreement can therefore be reached
in the first period only if the efficiency advantage of buyers in the development stage is
large enough to offset the innovator’s increase in the price she receives by waiting.
We find that when profits on the downstream market do not depend on the number of
buyers n, an increase in the number of buyers unambiguously delays the transfer. That
is, increased competition leads to increased inefficiency in the market for ideas. This is
because an increase in n increases the bargaining power of the innovator and the price she
can obtain in the second period. The innovator thus wants to wait, while the buyers want
to purchase the idea in the first period. The former effect is shown to dominate. When
profits on the downstream market also depend on n, counter to the usual intuition on
the positive role of competition, we find that greater competition among the buyers may
inefficiently delay the sale. An increase in the number of buyers has two countervailing
effects on the second period price: it increases the bargaining power of the innovator,
but it also decreases the downstream profits obtained from the innovation. That is, the
innovator obtains a larger slice of a smaller pie. For unconcentrated markets, the second
effect dominates and the second period price decreases with the number of buyers, thus
leading to earlier sale. The opposite is true for concentrated markets in several standard
examples we examine. Thus, our theory suggests that the typical shape for the effect of
the number of competitors on the delay in licensing will be an inverted U.
We also study a variant of the model in which we distinguish two types of potential
buyers: incumbents with existing products on the market and entrants without any
stake. While additional entrants affect competition for the innovation, the downstream
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profits an entrant realizes from signing depend only on the number of incumbents. We
show theoretically that delay in the transfer is increasing in the number of entrants and
typically decreasing in the number of incumbents.
Our empirical analysis of licensing contracts in the pharmaceutical industry provides
strong support for our theoretical predictions. This industry is a very good illustration of
the process we described. There appears to be an increasing division of innovative labor
between small biotechnology firms and large pharmaceutical companies. For instance,
Angell (2004) claims that one third of the drugs marketed by major pharmaceutical com-
panies originate from licenses with biotechs or universities. Biotechnology companies
seem to have a comparative advantage in achieving early stage discoveries, while large
pharmaceutical firms are considered more efficient in conducting later stage clinical test-
ing. We argue that biotechnology firms are initially better informed about the quality
of their drug candidates. However, verifiable information is revealed during the clinical
trials that are required for regulatory approval. Once a clinical trial phase is successfully
completed, the information asymmetry shrinks and potential buyers of a license become
more confident of the drug candidate’s value.
Figure 1 illustrates that in this industry, the fraction of licensing contracts signed
after the discovery and preclinical stages has increased by more than 30% since 1990,
a period also characterized by low numbers of new drugs launched. This delay in tech-
nology transfer also coincides with a period of increased market concentration, as the
pharmaceutical industry has experienced substantial merger activity. This justifies our
particular focus on the link between the number of potential buyers and the timing of
technology transfer.
To test the model’s predictions, we combine data on licensing deals and the stage
of drug development at signing with data on the number of firms in different therapeu-
tic classes (firms with drugs treating similar diseases) who compete on the downstream
product market as well as for the license. Controlling for various measures of financial
constraints and other factors, we provide empirical evidence that is consistent with our
theoretical prediction for the relationship between competition and licensing delay. We
also test the variant of the theoretical model that distinguishes entrants from incumbents
and again confirm the predictions of the theoretical model across a range of specifica-
tions to evaluate robustness. We find that the percentage change in the probability of
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Figure 1: Stage at licensing signing over time
62.71
57.29
54.25
15.25
17.56
16.7
11.86
7.35
9.71
5.08
11.96
12.78
5.08 5.85 6.57
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Pre-1990 1990-1999 Post-2000
P
e
r
c
e
n
t 
o
f 
to
ta
l 
li
c
e
n
s
e
s
Phase III
Phase II
Phase I
Preclinical
Discovery
late signing for a one-percent increase in the number of incumbents is -0.31, and the
corresponding figure for entrants is 0.17.
A key assumption in the theoretical model is that the innovator is better informed
about the quality of the idea than the buyers. Indeed, in the absence of asymmetric
information, competition has no effect on the timing of transfers in our model. In the
empirical analysis we examine subsets of the data based on criteria related to the extent
of asymmetric information about the quality of innovators and their ideas. We find
that the effect of the number of entrants and incumbents on delay is insignificant for
the “low asymmetry” subsets and significant for the “high asymmetry” subsets, which
is consistent with the model’s prediction on the relationship between competition and
information asymmetry.
There is a large literature that examines different aspects of licensing contracts, such
as the choice between fixed fees and royalty rates, allocation of control rights, both
theoretically and empirically (Lerner & Merges (1998), Lerner & Malmendier (2005),
Kamien & Tauman (1986), Beggs (1992) and Choi (2001)).1 However, with the exception
1See also Anand & Khanna (2000), Vishwasrao (2006), Mendi (2005), Higgins (2007).
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of Gans et al. (2008), the question of the timing of licensing has been left aside. Gans
et al. (2008) describe several reasons for deviations from the socially optimal timing
of technology transfer, including search costs, asymmetry of information and uncertain
property rights. Focusing on the last, they show that the resolution of uncertainty over
the scope of intellectual property (specifically a clarification of the claims granted to a
patent) speeds licensing. We concentrate instead on asymmetry of information, and we
examine more specifically the impact of market structure on timing.
In terms of methodology, as previously pointed out, our approach builds on other
models of sequential negotiations, in particular Stole & Zwiebel (1996), which examine
bargaining over labor inputs. In Stole & Zwiebel (1996), workers are also ordered in a
sequence. In a bilateral negotiation, if a worker agrees to a wage, the firm moves on to
the next worker in the sequence. However, these agreements are not binding. If there
is a breakdown in a later negotiation, this triggers a replaying of the sequence between
the firm and each remaining worker. This additional complexity does not arise in our
framework because of the exclusivity of licenses. This assumption is not only realistic in
many sectors, including the pharmaceutical industry, but also necessary for tractability,
since we introduce an essential feature to the model: asymmetric information. Despite
this additional complexity, we are able to unambiguously predict the timing of technology
transfer.
Much of the existing literature on technology transfers under asymmetric information
focuses on the case of weak or nonexsitent intellectual property rights. In particular,
Anton & Yao (2002) examines the problem of an innovator revealing some information
to convince a potential buyer of the quality of her product under the risk that the buyer
can then fully appropriate the invention without any form of payments. We concentrate
here on a different aspect: property rights do exist, but in order to convince a buyer of
the idea’s value, the innovator is forced to incur development costs even when she has no
comparative advantage in development.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present the model and determine the
main theoretical results in section 3. In section 4, we examine a number of robustness
checks. We test these results on data on licensing contracts in the pharmaceutical industry
in section 5 and 6. All proofs are presented in the appendix.
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2 Model
We consider a model with n ≥ 2 symmetric firms competing on a downstream market
and one innovator with a pre-existing idea. The n firms are the only potential buyers
of the idea from the innovator, and do not themselves attempt to innovate (for instance,
because their cost of early stage innovation is very high). The idea can be transferred
by signing a fixed price contract (more complex contracts are discussed in section 4.2).
The exact price is determined by a bargaining process that we describe below. Once a
contract is signed, the game ends: we consider only exclusive transfers that grant the full
ownership of the innovation to the buyer. Note that, to clarify the exposition, we will
from now on use the term ‘license’ for the contract, although the transfer could also be
done through other means, such as a direct acquisition of the innovator’s firm.
The game has two periods that differ from each other in two important ways. First, at
the end of the first period, if the innovator has not yet licensed the innovation, she needs
to decide whether to develop the product further. The potential buyers are assumed to
be more efficient in development. Development of the innovation from period 1 to period
2 costs ∆ for the innovator and zero for the buyers. Second, the information structure
differs between period one and two. Period 1 is characterized by asymmetric information
about the quality of the innovation. The innovator knows the quality of her idea, but
none of the buyers do. They share a common prior that the innovation is of a good type
with probability q or a bad type with probability 1− q. At the beginning of the second
period, the type of the innovation is revealed. This is a result of the verifiable evidence
generated during the development process.
2.1 Payoffs
If the innovation is of a bad type, we assume that it does not generate any profits. The
profits obtained from a good type innovation are given by:
• pi0(n) is the profit of a buyer if neither he nor any of his competitors sign a license.
• pil(n) is the profit of a buyer if one of his competitors signs a license.
• pi(n) is the profit of a buyer if he signs a license.
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We assume pi(n) ≥ pi0(n) ≥ pil(n) > 0: each buyer wants to license a good type
innovation, but should he fail to do so, he prefers that no rival licenses the innovation.
We assume that all profit functions are weakly decreasing in n and are continuously
differentiable.
We denote by κ the outside option of an innovator who has developed a good type
innovation until the second period and has not sold a license. It represents profits that
can be obtained from alternative uses. Note that if the innovation is not developed until
the second period, it does not generate any profits. We impose the following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 1: pi(n)− pi0(n) > κ
Assumption 1 states that if the quality of the innovation is known to be high, there
are gains from trade between the innovator and any buyer. Indeed, if a license is sold,
the aggregate profits of the negotiators are pi(n) while the aggregate profit without sale
is given by κ+ pi0(n).
2.2 Bargaining
Bargaining between the innovator and the buyers takes place as follows. All buyers
are randomly ordered in a sequence. The innovator negotiates one by one with each
buyer. We call each bilateral negotiation between the innovator and an individual buyer
a bargaining session. If bargaining breaks down with the current buyer, the innovator
starts a bargaining session with the next buyer in the sequence. If bargaining succeeds,
the game ends since licenses are exclusive.
As previously described, our model has two periods. If bargaining is unsuccessful
with all buyers in the first period, the innovator must wait for the second period to start
another sequence of negotiations. The order of bargaining is the same in the second
period.2 If all bargaining sessions fail in the second period, the players obtain their
outside options. Within a period, the innovator cannot restart negotiations with a buyer
with whom bargaining previously broke down. To summarize, each period involves at
most n bargaining sessions, and the game overall contains at most 2n sessions.
The bargaining procedure inside a session occurs as in the alternating offer game with
exogenous probability of breakdown introduced by Binmore et al. (1986). As in their
2Redrawing the order across periods does not qualitatively affect our results but complicates the
exposition: see Allain et al (2011).
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paper, there is no discounting and the two players alternate making offers. If an offer
is accepted, the game terminates. If it is rejected, the bargaining session breaks down
exogenously with probability  and the innovator moves to the next buyer in the sequence.
If not, a new offer is made. We also assume that with probability , a bargaining session
does not even start. That is, a breakdown can occur even before the start of a session.3
The information structure is as follows. All players know n, and buyers know their
positions in the sequence. However, the buyers cannot observe the negotiations between
the other buyers and the innovator. In particular, following breakdown of a negotiation
between the innovator and a particular buyer, buyers positioned later in the sequence do
not know the offers that were made and do not even know if a session ever started with
that buyer.
Our goal is to construct a general model of the sale of ideas, involving asymmetric
information between the buyers and the seller, that nevertheless allows us to obtain clean
predictions. In particular we are interested in examining how competition between poten-
tial buyers influences the timing of sale. This requires us to abstract from heterogeneities
between firms. Most models of oligopsony with homogenous firms do not capture any
effect of the number of buyers on price. For instance, if the innovator made take-it-or-
leave-it offers, n would not influence the bargaining power of the innovator, the innovator
would extract the full surplus regardless of n. Note also that if the buyers made simul-
taneous offers to the innovator, competition between them for an exclusive license would
leave them with no rents, independent of their number (as long as n ≥ 2). However, com-
petition between homogeneous buyers does affect price in our model. The assumption of
homogenous firms is not absolutely required; we show that an auction model where the
bidders have heterogenous values yields similar results (see section 4.1). Since sequential
bargaining is a more realistic description of how ideas are sold in practice, we emphasize
that approach here.
3 The timing of the sale of an ideas
In the context of this model, the socially optimal timing is to transfer the innovation
from the innovator to the buyer in the first period, as development is costless for buyers.
3The assumption that a breakdown may occur before the first round will prove essential to limit the
multiplicity of equilibria, as discussed in section 3.1.2.
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We show however that asymmetric information on the value of the innovation can delay
the transfer. We solve the game by backward induction. All the results are limit results
as the probability of exogenous bargaining breakdown  converges to zero.
3.1 The bargaining game
3.1.1 Bargaining in the second period
At the beginning of the second period, the type of the innovator’s idea is known to all.
If it is bad, no license is signed. The description that follows therefore focuses on the
case where the innovation is good. We define p2(k) as the price of a license in second
period when there are k buyers left in the sequence with whom the innovator has not yet
negotiated.
Consider the negotiations with the (n − k)th buyer (k buyers left in the sequence).
We first focus on the case k ≥ 1 and discuss the case of the last buyer separately. If the
negotiations are successful, the innovator obtains the price of the license p2(k) and the
buyer pi− p2(k). As shown in Binmore et al. (1986), the outcome of the bargaining game
when the probability of breakdown  converges to zero is given by the Nash bargaining
solution with the disagreement points equal to payoffs following breakdown.
In our setting, the payoffs in case of breakdown are determined by the outcome of the
remaining negotiations. If an agreement is expected to be signed with the next buyer in
the sequence, the innovator can expect the price p2(k−1) while the buyer expects profits
pil (the profits of a buyer if a license is signed by one of his competitors). This determines
the following recursive relationship for k > 1 :
p2(k)− p2(k − 1) = pi − p2(k)− pil (1)
Under Assumption 1, the expectation that bargaining will succeed with the next buyer
in the sequence is correct. Indeed, Assumption 1 (pi(n)−pi0(n) > κ) guarantees that there
are gains from trade with the last buyer. A buyer positioned earlier in the sequence has
even more incentive to sign, since he expects pil rather than pi0 if he does not sign himself.
The outside option of the seller in the sequence of negotiations decreases by construction:
p2(k) > p2(k − 1), as each buyer has to leave the seller a higher rent than the next
potential buyer. Thus, as shown in the following Proposition, an agreement is reached
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with the first buyer in the sequence.
PROPOSITION 1: If the innovation is good and bargaining failed in the first period,
a license is sold in the second period to the first buyer in the sequence at a price:
p2(n) =
(
1
2
)n
(κ+ pil − pi0) +
(
1−
(
1
2
)n)
(pi − pil) (2)
Note that the price p2(n) is increasing in n. A larger number of buyers in the sequence
allows the innovator to extract a larger share of the surplus.
3.1.2 Bargaining in the first period
In the first period, bargaining is more complex due to the information asymmetry between
the innovator and the buyers. We show that all Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria (PBNE)
share a common property that allows us to determine the equilibrium timing of licensing.
PROPOSITION 2: In all PBNE, a license is sold in the first period if and only if the
following condition is satisfied:
q(pi − pil) ≥ p2(n)−∆ (3)
To understand the mechanics of the negotiation, it is useful to consider the last bar-
gaining session in period one. Given Proposition 1, all players know that bargaining will
ultimately succeed in the second period if the idea is good. However, an innovator only
develops the product if the expected profits can cover the cost ∆: if p2(n) < ∆, the inno-
vator never develops the invention herself. Her outside option at the end of bargaining is
then zero, and a mutually beneficial agreement can always be found in the first period.4
4Note that, for a similar reason, an innovator with a bad idea would never wait for the second period
if her innovation generated strictly positive profits (and thus a positive price in the second period). In
such a case, there exist pooling equilibria where a license is signed in the first period when ∆ is high, and
separating equilibria where the good innovator signs in the second period and the bad innovator signs in
the first period for low ∆ (proof available upon request).
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We now consider the last bargaining session and the offer made by the innovator in
the case where p2(n) ≥ ∆. A good innovator will never offer a price less than p2(n)−∆,
as she can guarantee herself a price of p2(n) in the second period at a cost of ∆. A bad
innovator wants to mimic the good type, and thus requests the same price. If the buyer
accepts the offer and believes the probability of facing a good type innovator is still q
(and in equilibrium this belief is correct), his expected utility is qpi+ (1− q)pi0. However,
he can always guarantee himself his outside option, given by qpil + (1 − q)pi0. Indeed, if
he waits until the second period, he knows that a contract will be signed with the first
buyer in the random sequence if the innovation is good and he will therefore obtain pil.
We focused in the previous discussion on the last buyer in the sequence. If the last
potential buyer is expected not to sign, the one positioned just before the last in the
sequence finds himself in an identical situation as the last and will therefore not sign
either. The only potential buyer with a different perspective is the first in the sequence:
his outside option is higher than that of his competitors, as he anticipates that he will be
the one who signs a license in the second period. He therefore has even less incentive to
buy a license in the first period than his competitors. The condition for early signature
is thus determined by the incentives of the last buyer in the sequence.
If the condition is satisfied, the socially optimal timing of licensing is achieved: tech-
nology transfer takes place in the first period and the more efficient buyer develops the
innovation. However, for low values of the probability of facing a good type q or of
the efficiency difference ∆ between the innovator and the buyers, the threshold for early
signature is more difficult to meet and late (and inefficient) signature is more likely.
The condition of Proposition 2 can be re-expressed as follows: a license is signed in the
first period if and only if the cost of development for the innovator is sufficiently large
∆ ≥ ∆(n), where
∆(n) ≡ p2(n)− q(pi − pil). (4)
In the following sections, we examine how ∆(n), which we call the efficiency threshold,
varies with n. If ∆(n) increases with n, delays in licensing become more likely as the
number of competitors increases.5
It is important to point out that one particular assumption limits the multiplicity
5Note that we could have considered a variation of the model where ∆ would be drawn in a certain
interval. An increase in ∆(n) would then increase the probability of late signing.
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of equilibria. We assume that before the start of each individual bargaining session,
there is an exogenous risk of breakdown with probability . Therefore, regardless of the
equilibrium that we consider, starting negotiations with any buyer in the sequence is
always on the equilibrium path. For example, suppose that an equilibrium is such that
a license is signed with the third player. In equilibrium, the fourth player might still
negotiate if negotiations do not even start with the third player (an event that occurs
with probability ). Thus, in all equilibria, all buyers start negotiating with the same
belief q that the innovator is of a good type: the fact that the innovator approaches
a buyer positioned late in the sequence does not change that buyer’s belief about the
innovator’s type. In other words, the buyer does not interpret this fact as an endogenous
breakdown of prior negotiations that might indicate he is facing a bad type.
Note that delays are always inefficient in our framework because we assume a zero
cost of development for the buyer. Allowing for the buyer to face a positive cost of
development δ < ∆ could mitigate the welfare effects of a delay in licensing, as the buyer
would waste resources in developing an idea if he bought a bad type idea (which would
happen with probability q). However, as long as the buyer has a significantly lower cost
of development, δ < q∆, welfare remains higher in any equilibrium with signature in the
first period than in any equilibrium with signature in the second period. Even if the total
development cost of the buyers does not satisfy this condition, it is sufficient to assume
that any buyer can incur a minor cost δ′ < q∆ to observe the quality of the innovation
before sinking the large development costs.
3.2 The effect of market structure
In this section, we examine how the number of buyers in the market n affects the condition
of Proposition 2 and thus the timing of licensing. n may influence both the bargaining
power of each player and the downstream profits.
3.2.1 Profits do not depend on n
As a benchmark, we begin with the case where the profits (κ, pil, pi0, pi) do not depend on
n. For example, an additional competitor may not affect profits if innovations are purely
market expanding and have no business stealing effect. This case isolates the effect of
n, the number of firms competing for the license, on the bargaining power of the buyers
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and of the innovator. According to our results in section 3.1, in this particular case, the
price of the license in the second period p2(n) increases with n. The following proposition
states that the effect of n on the timing of licensing is also unambiguous in this case.
PROPOSITION 3: If the payoffs on the market do not depend on n, the efficiency
threshold increases with n: the condition for early licensing is harder to meet as the
number of buyers increases.
This result is intuitive. As n increases, the bargaining power of the innovator increases
in the second period and therefore p2(n) increases. The innovator with a good idea has
a greater incentive to wait to sign a license. Furthermore, as n increases, the expected
profit in the second period is unchanged for all buyers except the first in the sequence.
As we saw in the previous section, only the incentives of buyers later in the sequence
determine the condition to sign early. Thus, overall, an increase in n will delay signature.
We show in the next section that the results may be different if the number of competitors
impacts downstream profits in addition to bargaining power.
3.2.2 Profits depend on n
When the profits depend on n, the effect of a change in the number of competitors is
more subtle. There are two countervailing effects of n on the second period price. On
the one hand, it raises the bargaining power of the innovator, who gets a larger share of
the pie. On the other, it decreases the actual profits derived from the innovation, so the
size of the pie shrinks. The tension between these two effects on the second period price
yields an ambiguous effect of n on the timing of licensing.
To obtain precise predictions, more structure needs to be imposed. We assume that
profits decrease with n and are positive, a natural assumption in most models of com-
petition. We obtain a limit result for large values of n that is valid under a minimal
condition on payoffs.
PROPOSITION 4: If pi′(n) ≤ pi′l(n), then for sufficiently large values of n, the effi-
ciency threshold decreases in n: the condition for early licensing is easier to meet as the
number of buyers increases.
The intuition of this result is the following. As the number of buyers becomes large,
the innovator enjoys all the bargaining power and can extract all the surplus in the second
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period. From Proposition 2, the price in the second period approaches pi(n) − pil(n) for
large values of n. So if pi′(n) ≤ pi′l(n), the price decreases in n and licensing delays become
less likely.
Proposition 4 provides an unambiguous result for very competitive markets. For small
values of n, however, the opposite result may hold, leading to an inverted U-shape for
the relationship between number of competitors and delays in technology transfer. We
show in the Appendix that in two standard situations (namely an industry with Cournot
competition and process innovations, and an industry with Bertrand competition and
product innovations) the efficiency threshold follows either an inverted U shape or a
decreasing shape as a function of n.6
3.2.3 Entrants and incumbents
Our previous analysis assumed that all potential buyers are symmetric. In reality, of
course, the value of a license may differ across buyers for many reasons. In this section,
we allow for some heterogeneity of buyers, focusing on what we view as a key difference
between them: some potential buyers have existing products that would compete with the
licensed innovation, while others don’t. Formally, we assume that there are n incumbents
denoted by i ∈ {1, ..., n} and e potential entrants denoted by j ∈ {1, ..., e}. Entrants are
not active on the market prior to the innovation, but they may purchase the license and
thus enter the market.
The potential entrants are all symmetric. Their outside option, regardless of whether
someone else buys a license, is zero (since they have no existing products on the market
and we don’t take into account their profits on other markets). We denote by pie the
profit of an entrant who buys the license. For simplicity, we assume that κ = 0. The
profits of the incumbents are, as in the previous sections, pi if they get the license and
pi0 if no one buys a license. However, the profit of an incumbent if someone else buys
the license now depends on the identity of the buyer, since a new entrant increases the
number of competitors. We denote these profits pil if the buyer is another incumbent and
pile if the buyer is an entrant.
To keep the theoretical analysis tractable, we assume that the incumbents and en-
trants are “grouped” in the bargaining sequence. In other words, we consider two cases:
6Note also that the condition for Proposition 4, pi′(n) ≤ pi′l(n), is satisfied in these examples.
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either the innovator first bargains sequentially with all the entrants and then with all
the incumbents, or the order is the reverse. We also assume that players are ordered in
the bargaining sequence in such a way that the players with higher valuation bargain
first: if pie < pi (resp. pie > pi), the entrants are positioned later (resp. earlier) than the
incumbents.7 We present here the results in the case where the entrants bargain first.
The results are qualitatively similar in the other case (see Allain et al. (2011)).
PROPOSITION 5: All PBNE have the following properties:
1. The efficiency threshold increases with the number of entrants e (the condition for
early licensing is more difficult to meet).
2. The effect of the number of incumbents n on the efficiency threshold can be ambigu-
ous. However, when the number of entrants e is large enough, e > ê, the efficiency
threshold unambiguously decreases with n (the condition for early signing is easier
to meet).
Part 1 of Proposition 5 echoes Proposition 3. The number of entrants affects bar-
gaining power, but not profits on the downstream market (as at most one of them will
in the end be present on the market). Part 2 of Proposition 5, on the other hand, is a
reflection of the case considered in section 3.2.2. The effect of the number of incumbents
on the timing of licensing is potentially ambiguous as it affects both bargaining power
and downstream profits. However, if the number of potential entrants is large enough,
an increase in the number of incumbents unambiguously reduces licensing delays.
3.3 The role of asymmetric information
A key assumption we make in the model is that there is asymmetric information between
the licensor and potential licensees in the first period. In this section we argue that in
the case of symmetric information, there are no deviations from the optimal timing of
licensing. Thus, our results suggest that identifying an effect of the number of buyers
on timing can be seen as indirect evidence of the existence of asymmetric information
between licensors and licensees.
7We assume as before that the order of bargaining is the same in the first and second period.
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Suppose that both the innovator and the buyers are uncertain about the quality of
the invention and both share the same belief that the type is good with probability q.
Bargaining in the second period remains unchanged. In particular, given Assumption
1 (pi − pi0 ≥ κ), an agreement is always reached if the innovation is of the good type.
However, in the first period, the innovator is now uncertain about the quality of her
invention. In this case we obtain the following result.
PROPOSITION 6: If the innovator and the buyers share the same belief q that the
innovation is good, a license is always signed in the first period for all values of q and n.
If an agreement can be reached in the second period (i.e., Assumption 1 is satisfied),
then an agreement will be reached in the first period regardless of the degree of uncertainty
q and of the number of competitors n. The intuition is the following. If an agreement can
be reached in the second period when the idea is good, then there is an even larger surplus
that can be shared in the first period, since the buyers can develop the product at a lower
cost than the innovator. That is, the innovator risks a greater loss from developing an
idea that turns out to be bad than do the buyers, who have development costs of zero.
With uncertainty and symmetric information, we find that the license is signed at the
socially optimal time.
In Allain et al. (2011), we present a different interpretation of our model. Our result
for the effect of competition on the timing of licensing is also valid in the absence of
asymmetric information if the licensor and the licensees have different beliefs about the
probability of success in the first period. A typical example is the case of overconfident
innovators. We show that such a model will lead to similar predictions.
4 Robustness and Extensions
4.1 Model of auctions
As we previously noted, oligopsony models with homogenous buyers typically cannot
capture the effect of competition between potential buyers on the price of an exclusive
deal. We show below that a model of auction with some heterogeneity between buyers
yields the same type of results as our bargaining model although, as argued below, the
effect of the number of buyers on prices is less intuitive.
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We consider a model where in both periods the innovator can choose to run a second
price auction with a reservation price. If she does not run an auction in the first period,
or if she runs an auction but fails to sell the license because the reservation price is not
met, she can choose to pay the cost ∆ (known to all players) and develop the product
herself. We suppose that the profits that can be obtained from a good type innovation are
identical for all buyers and known to be pi(n). However there is a fixed cost of production
c that is drawn for each buyer from a distribution c ∼ F with support [c, c].8 The fixed
cost must be incurred after observing the value of the invention (it will be paid only if
the idea is good). Specifically, the value to a buyer of a bad idea is 0, but pi(n)− c if the
idea is good. For simplicity, we assume that pi(n)− c > κ and that pil = pi0 = 0.
We show in the Appendix that the unique bidding strategy for the buyers in both
periods is to bid their expected value for the good.9 Furthermore, the innovator will run
an auction in the first period if and only the extra profit she expects from waiting do not
cover the development cost ∆, as expressed in the following result:
PROPOSITION 7: An innovator with a good idea runs an auction in the first period
if and only if
∆ ≥ (1− q)(pi − E[cn2])
where cn2 is the second lowest cost among the n buyers. Furthermore, if she runs an
auction in the first period, she sets a zero reservation price and always sells a license.
We see that, if profits pi do not depend on n, licensing delays become more likely as
n increases. Indeed, the second period price mechanically increases as more draws are
taken from the cost distribution. The same logic as in Proposition 3 then applies. The
good innovator, who knows her quality, can fully extract this increase in the price in the
second period. The buyers, though, only consider the added cost, corresponding to a
higher price in period 2, if the innovator is good with probability q. The incentives of the
innovator to delay are stronger than the incentives of the buyers to sign earlier. This basic
intuition seems very general as long as the price in the second period is increasing with
the number of potential buyers. Furthermore, if profits also depend on n, this creates a
8Our auction is therefore one with private values. We need to have private values for the price to
vary with the number of buyers.
9A buyer with cost c bids q(pi − c) in the first period and pi − c in the second period.
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countervailing effect (pi(n) decreases and −E[cn2] increases), as in the previous sections.
The total effect cannot be characterized without putting more structure on the profit
function and on the distribution F , but this exercise could be easily conducted.
4.2 Milestone payments
We previously limited the analysis to contracts that involved a single upfront payment
for the innovation. In practice, most licensing contracts are more sophisticated and
employ milestone payments and/or royalties to mitigate adverse selection. The problem of
asymmetric information can be entirely overcome if the contract involves only a milestone
payment. In that case, the license is signed in the first period, the buyer develops the
product and makes the final payment in the second period if the product is revealed to
be good.
However, we never observe contracts with pure milestone payments in our data on
licensing contracts. Milestone-only contracts may not be feasible in the presence of a
liquidity-constrained innovator. As well, such contracts may lead to moral hazard for
buyers, who may not have sufficient incentives to develop the product. A detailed ex-
amination of these factors is beyond the scope of this paper. If we allow for two-part
tariffs, or any tariff including a combination of conditional and non-conditional payment,
and if we introduce an explicit constraint on how large the upfront payment needs to be,
the effect of market structure on the date of licensing is still relevant. More generally,
whenever contracts terms cannot completely offset the asymmetry, our results are still
relevant and inefficient delays may arise.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Background on the pharmaceutical industry
The results of our theoretical model are tested on data from the pharmaceutical industry.
We provide in this section some background on this industry and explain in particular
why the theoretical assumptions we made appear particularly reasonable in this context.
The pharmaceutical industry is indeed a very good illustration of the process we
captured in our model. There appears to be an increasing division of labor between small
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biotechnology firms and large pharmaceutical companies. In a 2006 survey of innovation,
The Economist notes that “Big Pharma’s R&D activity is now concentrated as much
on identifying and doing deals with small, innovative firms as it is on trying to discover
its own blockbuster drugs” Economist (2006). Biotechnology companies seem to have a
comparative advantage in achieving early stage discoveries, while large pharmaceutical
firms are considered more efficient in conducting later stage clinical testing. They can
in particular exploit their relationships with medical practitioners who participate in
running clinical trials or prescribe their other products. They also may benefit from
economies of scale and scope in the administration of clinical trials. Drug candidates
are usually sold with exclusive licensing contracts.10 Negotiations to sign the licenses
appear to fit quite closely the sequential bargaining model we use. They typically involve
an exclusive period during which the licensor may not hold discussions with any other
potential licensee.
An essential element of the model is that the seller is better informed about the
prospects for the drug candidate than the potential buyers. The empirical literature
attempting to assess the extent of adverse selection in this industry obtains mixed results.
Pisano (1997) finds higher failure rates of drug candidates licensed in from biotechnology
firms than those developed in-house by pharmaceutical firms, though Arora et al. (2004)
find the opposite. Failure rates alone do not establish asymmetric information, since
both the buyer and seller may agree that a project has a high probability of failure and
agree on a low price for the sale of the idea. However, there is at least casual evidence
that industry practitioners worry about buying a lemon. We find it plausible that the
licensing firm has some additional information about the value of its drug candidate,
even if considerable uncertainty exists. In particular, it may know more about possible
shortcomings: it may have internal information that suggests problems or limitations, but
that cannot be credibly disclosed. Some indirect evidence for this point is the observation
that pharmaceutical firms prefer to license late-stage candidates, despite paying much
higher fees: “To reduce the risk of licensing a drug that ultimately fails to win approval
from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), these companies make low offers
to biotechnology firms during preclinical testing...pharma companies often don’t commit
substantial resources until clinical trials demonstrate the drug’s safety and efficacy in
10Even though direct acquisitions of the company also occur, we will focus in the empirical analysis
on the licensing channel.
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humans. While this delay is understandable, it can cost companies tens of millions
of dollars in higher fees and royalty payments to the biotechs for every compound.”
(Kalamos et al. (2002))
We emphasize that, as we pointed out in section 3.3, if our assumption of asymmetric
information is incorrect but the other elements of our model are appropriate, we should
not expect to find any effect of market structure on the timing of licensing. Our results
can thus be seen as indirect evidence that such asymmetries do exist. In our empirical
analysis (see section 6.3), we examine the effect of market structure in cases where the
severity of asymmetric information may differ. Moreover, we also show in Allain et al.
(2011) that market structure would have a similar effect on delay in a model with over-
confidence, rather than information asymmetry. While we do not attempt to distinguish
these explanations empirically, they can be considered as two separate contributions of
this paper.
The last important element of the model is that verifiable information is revealed
during the development process. This is particularly true in this industry, since drug
development involves several distinct phases which are clearly defined and controlled by
regulatory agencies such as the FDA in the United States or the European Medicines
Agency (EMA). During the discovery phase, firms identify drug candidates for further
development in targeting a disease or indication. These are tested in animal subjects
during the preclinical phase. At this point, clinical trials in humans begin. Phase I trials
involve a small number of healthy volunteers to establish a drug candidate’s safety. Phase
II trials focus on the efficacy of the drug candidate in treating patients with the disease
and begin to identify side effects. Phase III trials are much larger studies that continue
to gather data on safety and efficacy. Verifiable evidence of a drug candidate’s quality is
produced at each phase and presented to the regulatory agencies.
The existence of a different type of information asymmetry is also possible: buyers
might have superior knowledge of the downstream market and profit potential. However,
this type of asymmetry is unlikely to decrease as the product is developed. It is therefore
not obvious how it could explain the systematic effect of market structure on the timing of
licensing that we uncover in our model and demonstrate in the pharmaceutical industry.
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5.2 Data
We draw our sample of licensing contracts from Recombinant Capital’s rDNA database. It
contains detailed information on all licensing deals in the pharmaceutical industry signed
since 1973, including financial details (total value, up-front and milestone payments,
royalty rates) for a subset of the agreements. It also provides information about the
geographical region covered by the license and about the type of contract (marketing,
production, research). Finally, it records the phase of development of the drug at the
time the license was signed.
Testing our theory requires us to identify a downstream market and the number of
potential licensees of an innovation. Since the rDNA database contains no information
on potential licensees or any other market level data, we exploit additional data sources
called R&D Focus and MIDAS, produced by IMS Health. MIDAS provides us with annual
data on total revenues by disease from 15 countries from 1993-2007. The R&D Focus
database tracks all drug candidates, or projects, in development since the early 1990s.
From this source, we not only add additional information about the development status of
each licensed product, but we can determine the experience (in developing drugs, as well
as marketing approved products) in different anatomical therapeutic classes (ATCs), of
both the licensor and licensee. This will allow us to build different definitions of potential
buyers of a license as well as important control variables.
We used a number of standard sources for firm-level information, such as VentureX-
pert, Compustat, Osiris, and CorpTech. We identify whether each firm is publicly traded
or privately held and collect some financial data, where possible, such as the amount
of venture capital financing. Because many of the firms in our study are privately held
and/or non US (roughly half are headquartered outside of the United States), our finan-
cial information is somewhat limited.
We restrict our analysis to contracts involving R&D on drug candidates that have not
yet been approved for launch, excluding co-marketing alliances. We focus on exclusive
deals with no geographic restriction, and on deals that are signed in the discovery, pre-
clinical or clinical phases of development. In order to match each deal to market-level
variables for which we have data, we include deals from 1990-2007. These exclusions
reduce our sample of interest to 6,426 (including observations for which the stage at
signing is missing) from a total of 14,976 deals in ReCap. In practice, this requires us
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to match each licensing agreement from the rDNA database with a project in the R&D
Focus database by hand using information on the partnering firms and the subject of the
license. In addition, we concentrate on deals that involve a specific drug candidate (or
candidates, in some cases) rather than those for the use of a technology platform (which
are rarely exclusive agreements). This process results in 2335 matches. We have the least
success in matching very early stage deals and those where the stage at signing is missing.
Important for our definitions of potential buyer and downstream market is a drug’s
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical classification (hereafter therapeutic class).11 Thera-
peutic classes correspond to disease markets, and are coded at different levels of speci-
ficity. For example, the broadest level is a single letter, such as group C for cardiovascular
system therapies. C02 refers to the subgroup of antihypertensive therapies, and C02A
is the narrower set of centrally-acting antiadrenergic agents. Drugs within a therapeu-
tic class may be considered as substitutes, but drugs within the same narrow class are
closer substitutes than those in the same broad class, and substitution is unlikely across
therapeutic classes. For example, “acne” (D10) is a separate market from “diabetes”
(A10), and human insulins (A10A) are closer substitutes than oral antidiabetics (A10B)
in the treatment of diabetes. We exclude the therapeutic class V7 (defined as “All other
non-therapeutic products”) because the set of products assigned to this class are not
therapeutic substitutes.
Drug candidates are often assigned to multiple therapeutic classes because they can
treat different diseases. In addition, most drug candidates have more than one firm listed
as co-developers. When counting the number of firms in a therapeutic class, we consider
all firms that are involved in the development of a project, and we include all projects
that are assigned to the therapeutic class. Thus, our measures of the number of firms in
a therapeutic class are very inclusive.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key variables in our analysis. We examine
only drug candidates that were licensed between 1990 and 2007, not the set of all drug
11The World Health Organization describes this classification scheme as follows: “In the Anatomical
Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system, the drugs are divided into different groups according
to the organ or system on which they act and their chemical, pharmacological and therapeutic properties.
Drugs are classified in groups at five different levels. The drugs are divided into fourteen main groups
(1st level), with one pharmacological/therapeutic subgroup (2nd level). The 3rd and 4th levels are
chemical/pharmacological/therapeutic subgroups and the 5th level is the chemical substance. The 2nd,
3rd and 4th levels are often used to identify pharmacological subgroups when that is considered more
appropriate than therapeutic or chemical subgroups.”
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candidates that were ever (or are currently) available for licensing. Our estimates there-
fore apply only to a selected sample. All variables are measured as of the date a license
was signed. The definitions of incumbents and entrants are described in section 6.4.
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5.3 Empirical specification
We want to test our theoretical predictions on the link between market structure and
the timing of licensing. We present two main categories of results. First we use our
baseline model, which treats all potential buyers as symmetric. In this case, as described
in section 3, the theoretical model predicts an inverted-U shape relationship between
number of potential buyers and delay in licensing. We test this prediction using as main
explanatory variables both the number of potential buyers and this number squared.
Second, we use the model of section 3.2.3, which differentiates incumbents with stakes
on the markets and potential entrants. The explanatory variables of interest in this case
are the number of incumbents and the number of entrants.
Our theoretical model assumes that potential buyers are identical, or differ only in
incumbency. In reality, of course, potential buyers vary in size, existing portfolios of
products, and many other factors. The empirical approach we adopt does not allow for
buyer characteristics to enter except through our definition of the set of potential buyers,
which we discuss below. Our focus is not on the identity of the buyer, but rather on the
timing of the sale.
For both sets of analysis we use the same empirical methods: logit, ordered logit and
a hazard rate model. The first approach is to define an “early” stage of licensing, such
as the discovery and preclinical phases, and a “late” stage as Phase I, II and III clinical
trials. Because regulators are directly involved beginning in Phase I, we consider this
stage to be the point at which information about quality is verifiable. As well, this is the
point at which testing involves human subjects and more complicated study design. An
alternative is to treat each of these distinct phases as a “period” and assume that a similar
trade-off exists between signing in stage i and delaying until stage i+ 1 for each stage i;
the difference is that rather than disappearing completely, the informational asymmetry
shrinks as each development stage is completed. We can think of the condition for signing
a license described in Proposition 2 as an unobserved latent variable y∗. Two natural
empirical models are the logit (for early vs. late) and ordered logit (for each phase of
development). In the case of the ordered logit, for example, the observed dependent
variable takes a discrete value corresponding to the development stage at signing as
follows:
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y = 0 (discovery phase) if y∗ ≤ 0
= 1 (preclinical phase) if 0 < y∗ ≤ µ1
= 2 (Phase I) if µ1 < y
∗ ≤ µ2
= 3 (Phase II) if µ2 < y
∗ ≤ µ3
= 4 (Phase III) if µ3 ≤ y∗
Our latent regression is
y∗ = βN + γX + 
where N is a vector of competition measures and X is a vector of controls, described
below.
The logit and ordered logit approaches have a number of appealing features. They
correspond very closely to our theoretical model, where the two periods differ in the
information available to the potential buyers. As a drug candidate progresses through
each stage, verifiable information is indeed revealed. Another approach, and that taken
by Gans et al. (2008), is the use of a hazard model. This approach treats a biotechnology
firm’s innovation as “at risk” for licensing from the time the drug candidate reaches the
preclinical stage of development, and examine what factors affect the hazard rate of the
drug candidate’s transfer to a licensee. Since censoring is not an issue in our data, we take
the simplest approach and regress the natural log of the months since a drug candidate
entered the preclinical phase on the same variables as used in the ordered logit. There
is considerable heterogeneity in the time required to complete clinical trials; drugs for
chronic conditions may require longer trials than those for acute conditions, for example,
and a hazard model may confound the complexity of trials with the strategic delay that
is our interest.
We exploit variation in the number of competitors across therapeutic classes, and
within therapeutic classes at different points in time, to identify the effect of market
structure. While this is our main focus, we include a number of controls that might
also affect licensing behavior. These include the extent to which a licensor faces capi-
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tal constraints, and various other factors such as experience in licensing (measured as
the number of previous licenses the biotech firm has granted), experience in drug devel-
opment (measured as the number of drug candidates the licensing firm has previously
initiated), market experience (measured as the number of drugs the licensing firm has
successfully launched). Because the availability of financing may vary over time, we also
include annual commitments by venture capitalists within the biotechnology and medical
industries. All specifications also include therapeutic class fixed effects, to control for
differences in demand as well as development costs that are likely to vary by disease, and
a control for the size of the therapeutic class market, measured as total annual revenues
from 15 countries for drugs assigned to that therapeutic class.
6 Results
We test separately the predictions of our baseline model and those of the model differ-
entiating entrants from incumbents. Most of our robustness checks, such as varying the
definition of potential buyers, will be presented in this second case.
6.1 Baseline model
Our starting point in this section is the condition for signing in the first period given
in Proposition 2. We have shown that this condition is easier to meet when additional
competition has little impact on downstream profits. This condition is less likely to hold
in a very concentrated market for standard models of downstream competition, such as
Cournot competition and differentiated Bertrand, although we have not established that
this is a general result. We examine the relationship between market structure and the
timing of a license by using the number of potential buyers and its square as the main
explanatory variables. A positive coefficient on the number of buyers and a negative
coefficient on the squared term would suggest that the effect of increased competition on
license timing has an inverted-U shape, as in the examples we presented.
We define the set of potential licensees of an innovation as those with existing products
in the same broad disease area, or 2-digit ATC, as the drug candidate licensed. Relative
to firms in other disease areas, firms meeting this definition are likely to have a good
understanding of the market potential and to be well-positioned to evaluate the scientific
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Figure 2: Effect of competition on the probability of late signature
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validity of a drug candidate available for license. In addition, such firms have pre-existing
relationships with doctors who treat the disease, who may enroll patients in clinical trials
as well as prescribe the drug once it is approved. In other words, these firms should have
relatively lower costs of conducting clinical trials and marketing the product. However,
firms may use licensing as a means of entering a disease area, and some firms focus
exclusively on internal development; indeed, any definition of potential licensee risks
excluding some actual buyers and/or including some that are not true competitors for the
license. For our baseline results, we focus on those firms that buy at least one license; this
essentially means that we don’t consider firms that mostly sell drug candidates (usually
small biotechs) as potential buyers. Robustness checks with respect to the definition of
potential buyers are presented in section 6.4.
Table 2 presents our baseline results for the three econometric models described above.
Competition appears to have an inverted U-shaped effect on the timing on licensing. This
effect is illustrated in Figure 2, which graphs the predicted probability of late signing
(using the estimates of the logit model) as the number of buyers changes with continuous
variables at their means for a US-based licensor that is not publicly traded. The mean
number of buyers using our very inclusive definition is 42, and the peak of the inverted
U is around 55.
Our main focus is on the effect of market structure on the timing of licensing, for
which our model proposes clear and testable predictions. We do not want to insist too
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Table 2: Baseline results
Variable Logit M-Logit Hazard
Intercept
-2.2233** -1.6605** -0.1384
(0.5437) (0.4523) (0.4369)
Buyers
0.0161* 0.0140* 0.0240**
(0.0097) (0.0080) (0.0080)
Buyers squared
-0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Total venture funding for industry
0.0225 0.0429** 0.0476**
(0.0219) (0.0184) (0.0186)
Total revenues in therapeutic class
0.0363** 0.0327** 0.0161
(0.0138) (0.0119) (0.0124)
Licensor market experience
0.0076 -0.0015 0.0115
(0.0108) (0.0096) (0.0096)
Licensor development experience
-0.0047 0.0059 -0.0118
(0.0107) (0.0095) (0.0095)
Licensor deal experience
-0.0193 -0.0471** -0.0057
(0.0235) (0.0203) (0.0205)
Licensor is publicly traded
0.5088** 0.4202** 0.6539**
(0.1776) (0.1537) (0.1562)
Licensor is based outside US
0.0530 0.1234 -0.0053
(0.1286) (0.1086) (0.1094)
Firms are co-located
-0.5903** -0.4604** -0.4542**
(0.1282) (0.1066) (0.1050)
Licensor is not in VentureXpert
data
0.4952** 0.5358** 0.4344**
(0.2068) (0.1730) (0.1675)
Licensor’s cumulative venture
financing
0.0046 0.0053* -0.0023
(0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0032)
Licensor’s funding in last round of
venture financing
-0.0097 -0.0106** 0.0042
(0.0059) (0.0051) (0.0050)
Licensor’s round of venture
financing
-0.0226 -0.0185 0.0306
(0.0382) (0.0331) (0.0326)
Licensor’s age
0.0711** 0.0712** 0.0792**
(0.0157) (0.0134) (0.0139)
Number Obs 1633 1633 1449
Log L or R2 -935.4465 -2084.579 .085
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much on the interpretation of the coefficients on the other explanatory variables, though
controlling for them could be important. The interpretation of the effect of being in the
same location is unambiguous: it will tend to decrease asymmetric information, and thus,
consistent with our theoretical model, lead to earlier licensing. But many of the other
variables can reflect several competing effects. A high value of q (i.e high chance of having
a successful drug) may be accompanied by a lower ∆ (smaller efficiency difference with
potential buyer). For instance, older firms or those that are publicly traded might have
better products (higher q), but also be less liquidity constrained or have already access
to cheaper ways of conducting clinical trials (lower ∆). Our reduced-form empirical
approach limits the interpretation of the coefficients on these measures.
6.2 Entrants and incumbents
In reality, potential buyers of a license may not be equally exposed to downstream com-
petition and its countervailing effect on licensing delay. Firms that market a product in
the same narrow disease area are most affected by downstream competition, while those
that are active in related diseases are less so. We refer to the former as incumbents
in the market, and the latter as entrants. We estimate the model of section 3.2.3 that
differentiates between incumbents and entrants. We showed that the number of entrants
unambiguously delays licensing. While the effect of the number of incumbents is am-
biguous, but we showed that in general we should expect an increase in the number of
incumbents to reduce delays in licensing. We therefore use the number of entrants and
incumbents as the main explanatory variables in the following specifications. We expect a
negative coefficient on the number of incumbents and a positive coefficient on the number
of entrants.
Using a similar logic to our definition of potential buyers discussed above, we now
define incumbents as firms with drugs in the same 3-digit ATC as the licensed drug,
while entrants are firms with drugs in the same 2-digit ATC as the licensed drug, but
not in the same 3-digit ATC. Both definitions include only firms that buy at least one
license in our data. The results are presented in table 3; the specifications include all
the additional explanatory variables as in our baseline case, but we report only the
coefficients for incumbents and entrants. Across all specifications, the predictions of
our theoretical model are confirmed: an increase in the number of incumbents (resp.
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Table 3: Results with incumbents and entrants
Variable Logit M-logit Hazard
Incumbents
-0.0169** -0.0232** -0.0116**
(0.0050) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Entrants
0.0113** 0.0080** 0.0145**
(0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0035)
Number Obs 1633 1633 1449
Log L or R2 -926.4657 -2069.873 .095
entrants) decreases (resp. increases) licensing delays. To assess the importance of the
effect of competition, we calculate the average elasticity of the probability of late signing
with respect to incumbents and entrants. The percentage change in the probability of
late signing for a one-percent change in the number of incumbents is -0.31, and the
corresponding figure for entrants is 0.17.
6.3 Asymmetric information
In our model, inefficiencies arise only in the presence of asymmetric information. To
confirm the importance of this factor, we test our model on different sub-samples for
which we expect information asymmetries to be high or low. Asymmetric information is
difficult to quantify, but we argue that it is likely to be greatest in the case of licensors
that have yet to establish themselves as capable of producing good drug candidates or
as trustworthy partners. Nicholson et al. (2005) show that these firms receive the largest
discount from new partners, for example, and cite deal experience as a means of signalling
quality. We therefore define “high asymmetry” licensors as those with fewer than 3 deals
prior to its current one; we obtain similar results using a definition based on development
experience. An alternative definition is based on a firm’s status as a public or private
firm. Public firms are subject to greater scrutiny and required by law to disclose specific
information to shareholders. Therefore, we might expect public licensors to have less
private information as well as less subject to liquidity constraints. We estimate our
models using this split as well.12
Table 4 indicates that our results are strongest for the subset of deals where asym-
metric information is likely to be high (as above, we report only a subset of coefficients
12Note that this split can also possibly separate firms according to their degree of over-confidence.
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Table 4: Results comparing information asymmetry
Variable High asym. Low asym. Private Public
Incumbents
-0.0245** -0.0031 -0.0202** 0.0048**
(0.0059) (0.0112) (0.0056) (0.0000)
Entrants
0.0086* 0.0180* 0.0116** 0.0103**
(0.0045) (0.0109) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Number Obs 1254 379 1388 245
Log L -697.9432 -200.6718 -760.5830 -144.2832
but include the same set control variables as in the previous sets). Licensing agreements
involving licensors with an established history of partnerships do not yield statistically
significant coefficients on competition. Similarly, competition has a very small, although
significant, effect on licensing agreements involving publicly traded licensors. We inter-
pret these findings as additional support for our model: if the effect of competition were
the same in both high asymmetry and low asymmetry cases, this would suggest that
informational asymmetry is not an underlying mechanism driving the timing of licensing.
6.4 Alternative definitions of potential buyers
An important concern in the empirical analysis is that our key variables of interest, those
for buyer competition, may be measured with error because we can’t observe for certain
which firms may have considered a license for a particular drug candidate. In this section,
we explore alternative definitions of potential buyers. Our previous definition was based
on the argument that firms with market experience in related areas would have the highest
valuation for, and best ability to evaluate, potential drug candidates. Levine (2007), in
her paper on licensing of biotechnology drugs, defines a potential buyer as any firm that
markets a biotechnology product in the US, and allows their valuation to depend on their
experience in different disease areas. We consider non-US markets and do not distinguish
prior marketing of a biotechnology product from that of small molecule drugs, but our
previous definition also restricted the set of potential buyers to those that actually buy a
license at least once in our data. In this section, we consider two alternative definitions
of potential buyers to check the robustness of our findings.
First, we define incumbents and entrants as before except without the restriction that
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Table 5: Results with first alternative definition of potential buyers
Variable Logit M-logit Hazard
Incumbents
-0.0035** -0.0058** -0.0025*
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Entrants
0.0058** 0.0045** 0.0068**
(0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Number Obs 1633 1633 1449
Log L or R2 -927.4660 -2072.446 .095
Table 6: Results with second alternative definition of potential buyers
Variable Logit M-logit Hazard
Incumbents
-0.0254 -0.0496** -0.0031
(0.0211) (0.0177) (0.0175)
Entrants
0.0232* 0.0106 0.0337**
(0.0127) (0.0104) (0.0105)
Number Obs 1633 1633 1449
Log L or R2 -932.5247 -2081.531 .087
firms that buy a license at least once in our data set. This set includes many firms that
may not be seeking to license in external drug candidates. For example, a small firm that
co-developed a drug with a much larger partner, but that has no marketing capabilities
of its own, is counted as a potential buyer under this definition. Table 5 presents the
results from our three econometric models using this alternative definition. We again
find a negative and significant coefficient on the number of incumbents and a positive
and significant coefficient on the number of entrants. Second, we define incumbents and
entrants as in the previous section except that we restrict buyers to be large, publicly
traded firms (those we believe are most likely to have the necessary commercialization
and marketing skills). The results, presented in table 6, are weaker in terms of statistical
significance, though of the expected signs. Because most big firms are active in a large set
of disease areas, there is less variance in the number of potential buyers across therapeutic
classes for us to identify the effect of competition. As before, both tables report only the
coefficients relevant to market structure, but all specifications include the same control
variables as the baseline case.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze, both theoretically and empirically, inefficiencies in the transfer
of technologies. We focus in particular on a question that has been largely neglected
in the literature, the effect of competition on the timing of technology transfers. One
of the important conclusions is that a decrease in the number of incumbents and an
increase in the number of entrants on the market may inefficiently delay the signature of
a license contract, or more generally, that competition has two countervailing effects on
the efficiency of markets for technology.
We present a model of sequential bargaining that incorporates a number of elements
that characterize markets for technology in practice. Of particular importance is the
asymmetry of information between the buyer and seller of an idea. Despite the complexity
that it shares with other models of sequential bargaining, we are able to obtain testable
predictions that are confirmed by our empirical analysis. Empirically, our results on
the effect of competition on licensing of pharmaceuticals are economically significant:
the percentage change in the probability of late signing for a one-percent change in the
number of incumbents is -0.31 and the corresponding figure for entrants is 0.17.
The ambiguous effect of competition on delays in licensing appears to be robust: we
obtain similar results with a bargaining model and with an auction model. Though the
pharmaceutical industry is particularly well-suited for our application, our results should
be relevant in any industry where the division of labor in the innovative process exists,
where early stage innovators have better information on the quality of their innovation
than later developers, and where innovators face a higher cost of providing information
about quality through the development process than do potential buyers. For example,
ideas generated in a university setting may be difficult to transfer because academic
scientists may face a very high cost of proving their quality.
Our model is not specifically designed to analyze the issue of mergers, but our re-
sults suggest that merger reviews in highly technological areas should consider this addi-
tional effect of the merger on upstream licensing markets. The pharmaceutical industry
has undergone significant consolidation in recent decades, particularly between the large
multinationals that are the typical buyers of licenses. However, there is much concern
regarding a slowdown of innovation in this industry that the widespread use of licensing
has failed to reverse. This paper highlights some frictions in licensing and the role of
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competition that may at least partially explain these patterns.
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8 Appendix (not to be published)
Proposition 1
Consider the case where all negotiation failed before the last sequence in the second
period. Consider the bargaining session with the last buyer. If a license is signed at a
price p, the buyer receives pi − p and the innovator p, whereas if the negotiation fails
they respectively receive pi0 (as the current negotiation is the last one, no license will be
signed if it fails) and κ. As  converges to zero, Binmore et. al. (1986) show that the
bargaining outcome is defined by the Nash bargaining solution where the surplus is split
equally. Under Assumption 1, pi− pi0 ≥ κ, and thus there is room for an agreement. The
continuation equilibrium is thus such that a license is indeed sold to the last buyer at a
price p2(1) defined by:
p2(1)− κ = pi − p2(1)− pi0 ⇒ p2(1) = 12(pi − pi0 + κ)
Consider now the previous negotiation rounds in the second period. When  converges
to zero we show the following recursive property:
Pk: When there are k > 1 buyers left in the sequence, a license is sold at a price
p2(k), where:
p2(k) =
(
1
2
)k
(κ+ pil − pi0) +
(
1−
(
1
2
)k)
(pi − pil)
We first show this property for k = 2, i.e when there are only two buyers left in
the sequence. Consider the negotiation between the innovator and the buyer before last
(k = 2), assuming that all previous negotiations failed. Both firms anticipate that if they
do not sign, bargaining with the last buyer will succeed: default options are thus pil for
the buyer and p2(1) for the innovator. If a license is signed, the price is determined by
an equal split of the surplus and the recursive relation is therefore
p2(2)− p2(1) = pi − p2(2)− pil
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Using the value of p2(1) previously derived, we find:
p2(2) =
(
1
2
)
(κ+ pil − pi0) +
(
1
2
)
(pi − pil)
The last step is to show that a license is indeed signed, i.e pi − pil > p2(1) ⇔ pi − 2pil +
pi0−κ > 0. This condition is satisfied because of Assumption 1 and the fact that pi0 > pil.
Therefore, property P2 is correct.
Pk−1 ⇒ Pk : Consider the case where k buyers are left in the sequence. Because of
property Pk−1, the buyer and the innovator know that a license will be signed with the
next buyer in the sequence, if they fail to agree.13 Therefore, an equal split of the surplus
gives:
p2(k)− p2(k − 1) = pi − p2(k)− pil
According to Pk−1
p2(k − 1) =
(
1
2
)k−1
(κ+ pil − pi0) +
(
1−
(
1
2
)k−1
)(pi − pil
)
Replacement in the previous expression gives:
p2(k) =
(
1
2
)k
(κ+ pil − pi0) +
(
1−
(
1
2
)k)
(pi − pil)
The last step is to show that a license is indeed signed, i.e there is room for bargaining:
pi − pil > p2(k − 1). This is equivalent to pi − 2pil + pi0 − κ > 0, property already shown
to be correct. We have thus shown that Pk is correct.
The result stated in Proposition 1 is property Pk for k = n buyers initially in the
sequence.
Proposition 2
Note first that there cannot exist a separating equilibrium with signature in the first
period, as a buyer would not pay a higher price for a license with a bad type, and if the
13Formally, the disagreement points are: (1− )p2(k− 1) + (1− )p2(k− 2) + ...+ (k− 1)κ = for the
innovator and (1− (k− 1))pil + (k− 1)pi0. As  converges to zero we obtain the reported disagreement
points.
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price for the good type were higher a bad type innovator would always profitably deviate
by mimicking a good type. We therefore focus on pooling equilibria. Note then that if
∆ > p2(n), then if no license is signed in the first period, the innovator does not develop
the product. Thus, when the innovator negotiates with the last buyer in the sequence
in period 1, her outside option is zero. Bargaining will therefore necessarily succeed in
period 1. For the rest of the proof we thus concentrate on the case ∆ ≤ p2(n). Note that
the condition stated in Proposition 2 is ∆ ≥ ∆(n) = p2(n)−q(pi−pil) where ∆(n) < p2(n)
(see proof of Proposition 3). Thus if we show that the result of Proposition 2 holds for
∆ ≤ p2(n) we have completed the proof.
Step 1: If the condition of Proposition 2 is satisfied then, in all PBNE, a license is
signed in the first period
Suppose there exists a PBNE such that the license is signed in period 2. We know in
period 2, bargaining immediately succeeds if the innovation is good, and the price paid
is p2(n).
Consider the last bargaining session in period 1. Consider a round where the buyer
makes an offer. If he offers a price p′ > p2(n) − ∆ this offer is accepted by both types
of innovators. Indeed the best the innovator can hope for in equilibrium is to obtain
p2(n) in the following period and he will have to pay ∆ to develop the product from
period 1 to period 2. With this offer, the utility of the buyer is qpi + (1 − q)pi0 − p′.14
If he waits for period 2, his expected utility is qpil + (1 − q)pi0. The condition given in
Proposition 2 guarantees that there exists a price p′, acceptable to both types of innovators
(p′ > p2(n)−∆) such that: qpi + (1− q)pi0 − p′ > qpil + (1− q)pi0. There is therefore no
PBNE where the license is signed in period 2 since we can always construct a profitable
deviation.
Step 2: If the condition of Proposition 2 is not satisfied then in all PBNE, the license
is signed in the second period
Consider a PBNE. Consider the last bargaining session in period 1 when the innovator
has negotiated with all but one buyer. Suppose the beliefs of the last buyer are that the
innovator is of a good type with probability q′.
14Note that in a PBNE beliefs must be consistent on the equilibrium path so that the buyer expects
the quality of innovation to be good with probability q.
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Consider first inside this session a round where the innovator makes the offer. For a
good type innovation she always asks for a price pt ≥ p2(n) − ∆ as she knows she can
guarantee herself at least p2(n)−∆ by developing the product herself. The bad type will
always mimic the behavior of a good type: if she reveals her type, no offer will be accepted
or made to her. We examine the optimal response of the buyer. If the buyer accepts the
offer, he obtains an expected payoff of q′pi + (1 − q′)pi0 − pt. However, he never accepts
an offer that yields a smaller payoff than what he can guarantee himself if he rejects all
offers and obtains his outside option q′pil + (1 − q′)pi0. So, if q′(pi − pil) < p2(n) −∆ no
equilibrium offer by the innovator is acceptable to the buyer.
Consider now a round where the buyer makes an offer. In equilibrium he offers a
price pt that is such that q
′pi − pt ≥ q′pil. Furthermore, he knows that all offers lower
than p2(n) − ∆ will be rejected by the good type innovator and might be accepted by
the low type. Such an offer is never made in equilibrium. So if q′(pi − pil) < p2(n) −∆,
no equilibrium offer by the buyer is acceptable to the innovator.
Finally, in all equilibria, q′ = q. Indeed, given that there is an exogenous probability of
breakdown η before each session, a bargaining session between the innovator and the last
buyer in the sequence is on the equilibrium path regardless of the equilibrium. Therefore,
the last buyer does not update his beliefs based on the fact that the innovator comes to
him.
Therefore if the condition of Proposition 2 is not satisfied, in any PBNE no license is
signed in the subgame where the innovator negotiates with the last buyer in the sequence.
In any PBNE, when the innovator bargains with the buyer who is the one before last
in the random sequence, both know that the negotiations will fail in the last round of
negotiations in period 1. The continuation values are then identical to those of the last
and we find that the same condition applies to all potential buyers but the first one in
the sequence. The outside option of the first potential buyer to negotiate is higher than
that of his competitors, as he anticipate that he will be the one who signs a license in the
second period: he therefore has even less incentives to buy a license in the first period
than his competitors. Reasoning recursively we can conclude that if the condition is not
satisfied, no agreement can be reached in period 1.
Existence of an equilibrium
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We show here that under the condition of Proposition 2, there exists a pooling equi-
librium where a license is signed in the first period and firms have passive beliefs.
Assume that:
p2(n)−∆ ≤ q(pi − pil)
There exists an equilibrium where a license is signed with the first buyer to negotiate in
the first period. The following strategies sustain this equilibrium:
• If negotiation starts with the n−k+1th potential buyer in the sequence, and if this
buyer believes that the innovation is good with probability q′:
– In any round where the buyer makes the offer, it offers p1(k) ≡ q(pi − pil)(1−
1
2k
) + 1
2k
(p2(n)−∆);
– In any round where the seller makes the offer, it offers p1(k);
– In any round where the seller makes the offer, the buyer accepts the offer if
and only if it is lower than or equal to p1(k);
– In any round where the buyer makes the offer, the seller accepts the offer if
and only if it is higher than or equal to p1(k).
• Initially, all potential buyers share the same prior belief regarding the quality of
innovation (that it is good with probability q). We assume that out-of-equlibrium
beliefs are passive (i.e. if a buyer receives an out-of-equilibrium offer, he does not
modify its beliefs: see McAfee & Schwartz (1994).
Note that a bad innovator mimics the strategy of a good innovator. We show that
there is no profitable deviation from this equilibrium candidate. If all negotiations fail in
the first period, we have characterized in Proposition 1 the second period continuation
equilibrium outcome. We consider now the first period.
There is no profitable deviation in this bargaining sequence:
• If the seller deviates by asking for a higher price pD ≥ p1(k) in a round where it
makes the offer, with passive beliefs the buyer does not revise its beliefs. The buyer
thus does not accept the offer.
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• If the seller deviates by asking for a lower price pD ≤ p1(k) in a round where it
makes the offer, with passive beliefs the buyer does not revise its beliefs. The buyer
accepts the offer but this deviation is not profitable for the seller, irrespective of its
type, as it can obtain p1(k) in the next round.
• If the buyer deviates by offering a higher price pD ≥ p1(k) in a round where it
makes the offer, the seller accepts the offer and it is not profitable for the buyer.
• If the buyer deviates by offering a lower price pD ≤ p1(k) in a round where it makes
the offer, the seller will not accept the offer.
Proposition 3
According to the result of Proposition 1, the price of a license in the second period is
given by:
p2(n) = (pi − pil)− 1
2n
(pi − 2pil + pi0 − κ)
Furthermore, Assumption 1 and pil ≤ pi0 imply that pi− 2pil + pi0−κ > 0. Thus, p2(n)
increases with n.
We can reexpress the condition of Proposition 2 that guarantees that the license is
signed in the first period:
∆ ≥ ∆(n)
where ∆(n) = p2(n)− q(pi − pil)
We have
∆′(n) = [pi − 2pil + pi0 − κ] ln(2)
2n
Therefore ∆(n) is increasing in n.
Proposition 4
In the case where profits depend on n, we find:
p′2(n) = (pi
′(n)− pi′l(n)) +
ln(2)
2n
(pi(n)− 2pil(n) + pi0(n)− κ)− 1
2n
(pi′(n)− 2pi′l(n) + pi′0(n))
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Furthermore, we examine how the benchmark ∆(n) varies with n
∆′(n) = p′2(n)− q [pi′(n)− pi′l(n)]
We see that if we take the limit as n→ +∞
lim
n→+∞
∆′(n) = lim
n→+∞
(1− q) (pi′(n)− pi′l(n))
Under the condition of Proposition 4, limn→+∞∆′(n) ≤ 0 and thus the probability of
signing in period 1 increases in n.
Cost reducing innovation under Cournot competition
Assume that the n buyers initially produce a homogenous good at the same constant
marginal cost c. They compete in quantities and demand is assumed to be linear: D(p) =
1− p, where p is the price of the good. The outcome of a good type innovation is a new
process that reduces the production cost to zero (a bad innovation does not modify the
production cost). We also assume that the innovator’s outside option is κ = 0.
The initial profits on the product market are pi0(n) =
(1−c)2
(n+1)2
. Signing a license
for a good innovation results in asymmetric competition, as the cost of the licensee is
lower than that of his competitors. If the innovation is good, the licensee thus receives
pi(n) = (1+c(n−1))
2
(n+1)2
whereas his competitors receive pil(n) =
(1−2c)2
(n+1)2
. Given these payoffs,
Assumption 1 holds. Note that the innovation is drastic and the licensee becomes a
monopoly if c ≥ 1
2
. We only consider the more interesting case where c < 1
2
.
We can show that the condition of Proposition 4, pi′(n) ≤ pi′l(n), is satisfied in this
case. Therefore, for large values of n, the efficiency threshold ∆(n) decreases in n (the
condition for signing a license is easier to meet). Straightforward comparative statics
reveal that the threshold decreases in q, and can even become negative for low values of
n, in which case a license is always signed in the first period. Figure 3 plots the threshold
in the case c = 0.1 for several values of q. The threshold has an inverted U-shape in n.
Bertrand competition with differentiated products
Consider another example based on a differentiated goods model. Assume that the n
buyers initially sell n symmetrically differentiated goods with a constant marginal cost c.
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They compete in prices. Following Motta (2004), we derive a simple model of consumer
preferences from Shubik & Levithan (1980): the consumer’s utility is given by
U(q1, ..., qn) = v
n∑
i=1
qi − n
2(1 + µ)
[
n∑
i=1
q2i +
µ
n
n
(
∑
i=1
qi)
2
]
where qi is the quantity of good i consumed, µ is the degree of product substitution
between the goods (µ ∈ [0,+∞]) and v is positive and larger than c. The demand for
each good is thus: 15
Di =
1
n
(
v − pi(1 + µ) + µ
n
n∑
j=1
pj
)
.
The innovation corresponds to the introduction of a new product. If no license is
signed, the market is composed of n symmetric firms with differentiated products. If one
firm, say n, signs a license with the (good) innovator, it introduces a new product. The
competition game is now asymmetric, with the licensee selling two of the existing (n+ 1)
products. We derive below equilibrium prices and profits:
If no license is signed, all n firms are symmetric, each selling one good. Profit maxi-
mization of the symmetric game yields the following prices and profits:
pi = c+
n(v − c)
2n+ µ(n− 1)
pi0(n) =
(v − c)2(n+ µ(n− 1))
(2n+ µ(n− 1))2
Consider now the case where one firm, say n, signs a license with the innovator in pos-
session of a good type innovation, thus introducing a new product. The competition
game is now asymmetric, firm n selling two of the existing (n+ 1) products, whereas its
competitors sell one each.
Firm n’s profit is now
Πn(pn, pn+1) = (pn − c)Dn(p1, ...pn, pn+1) + (pn+1 − c)Dn+1(p1, ...pn, pn+1)
15Note that in this model, aggregate demand is independent of the substitution between the products,
and does not change with the number of products if all prices are equal.
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Whereas firm i’s profit, for i ∈ {1, .., n− 1}, is
Πi(pi) = (pi − c)Di(p1, ...pn, pn+1)
The equilibrium of the pricing game yields the following prices (all prices are above c and
generate positive demands):
pi =
v + (1 + µ)(nv + c(1 + n+ (n− 1)µ))
2− µ2 + n(1 + µ)(2 + µ) for i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}
pn = pn+1 =
v(2 + µ+ 2n(1 + µ)) + c(2 + 2n(1 + µ)2 − µ(1 + 2µ))
4− 2µ2 + 2n(1 + µ)(2 + µ)
and the profits are
pi = Πn =
(c− v)2(1 + n+ µ(n− 1))(2 + µ+ 2n(1 + µ))2
2(1 + n)2(2− µ2 + n(1¯ + µ)(2 + µ))2
pil = Πi =
(c− v)2(1 + n+ µn)3
(1 + n)2(2− µ2 + n(1¯ + µ)(2 + µ))2 for i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}
Given these results, Figure 4 plots the efficiency threshold for c = 0.1, µ = 0.5 and
v = 1 for several values of q. Though the sufficient condition of Proposition 4 is not
always satisfied, the efficiency threshold has an inverted U-shape in the example we give.
Proposition 5
Claim: In equilibrium the license is signed in period 1 iff the following conditions are
satisfied:
∆ > ∆̂(n, e) = pE,I2 (e, n)− qpie
where pE,I2 (e, n) is the price in the second period where the license is sold to the first
entrant at a price:
pEI2 (e, n) = (1−
1
2e
)pie +
(
1
2
)n+e
(2pil − pi0 − pi) + 12e (pi − pil)
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Figure 4: Bertrand c = 0.1, µ = 0.5, v = 1
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Proposition 5 is then a direct consequence. Indeed we have:16
∆̂ = pE,I2 (e, n)− qpie = (1− q)pie + 12e
[
pi − pil − pie +
(
1
2
)n
(2pil − pi0 − pi)
]
We therefore have:
∂∆̂
∂e
= −ln(2) 1
2e
[
pi − pil − pie +
(
1
2
)n
(2pil − pi0 − pi)
]
> 0
and
lime→+∞
∂∆̂
∂n
= (1− q)∂pie
∂n
< 0
Proof of the claim:
Second period The sequence of bargaining in both periods is e entrants followed by
n incumbents. In period 2, if bargaining fails with the e entrants, under Assumption 1 a li-
cense will be signed with the first incumbent at a price pEI2 (0, n) =
(
1
2
)n
(pil − pi0) +
(
1− (1
2
)n
)
(pi − pil)
(same reasoning as for equation (2) in Proposition 1).
Consider the second period negotiation with the last entrant. If bargaining fails, the
innovator obtains pEI2 (0, n) and the entrant 0. If it succeeds, the innovator gets p
EI
2 (1, n)
and the entrant pie − pEI2 (1, n). The equal split of the surplus implies:
pEI2 (1, n) =
1
2
(pie + pEI2 (0, n)) =
1
2
pie +
(
1
2
)n+1
(2pil − pi0 − pi) + 12(pi − pil)
If it starts, negotiation with the last entrant succeeds since pie > pi > p
EI
2 (0, n) implies
pEI2 (1, n) > p
EI
2 (0, n). Note that p
EI
2 (1, n) < pie.
Consider the second period negotiation with the entrant before last. If bargaining
fails, the innovator obtains pEI2 (1, n) and the entrant 0. If it succeeds, the innovator gets
pEI2 (2, n) and the entrant pie − pEI2 (2, n). The equal split of the surplus implies:
pEI2 (2, n) =
1
2
(pie + pEI2 (1, n)) = (1−
1
22
)pie +
(
1
2
)n+2
(2pil − pi0 − pi) + 122 (pi − pil)
Note that pEI2 (2, n) > p
EI
2 (1, n). As a consequence, under Assumption 1, if negotia-
16Since pie > pi and by Assumption 1, 2pil < pi0 + pi
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tions start in the second period, signature occurs with the first entrant at a price
pEI2 (e, n) = (1−
1
2e
)pie +
(
1
2
)n+e
(2pil − pi0 − pi) + 12e (pi − pil)
First period
We now show that a license is signed in period 1 if and only if:
∆ > ∆̂(n, e) = pE,I2 (e, n)− qpie (5)
First step: suppose condition (5) is satisfied and a license is signed in period 2.
We show that then, in any PBNE, there exists a deviation in the first period. Consider
negotiation with the last entrant in period 1. If the negotiation fails, this entrant knows
he will not sign a license and will make zero profits.17 If he signs he expects a profit
pie: in a round where he makes an offer, he can offer a price larger than p
E,I
2 − ∆ and
get a larger surplus than by waiting if condition (5) is satisfied; Such an offer will be
accepted by both types of innovators, and this constitutes a deviation from the candidate
equilibrium.
Second step: Suppose condition (5) is not satisfied. Then we show a license is signed
in the second period.
Following the same logic as Proposition 2, we know that in this case, if pE,I2 (e, n)−∆ >
q(pi − pile), no profitable deviation is possible in negotiation with the last incumbent in
period 1. This condition is implied by the fact (5) is not satisfied since pie > pi. The same
logic applies for all the previous incumbents who effectively become the last.
Given condition (5) we also know that none of the entrants other than the first will sign
in period 1 either. Consider finally the negotiation with the first entrant in the sequence.
If he signs in period 1, his expected reward is qpie while if he waits, his expected profit
is q(pie − p2(0, e)). So if qpie − q(pie − p2(0, e)) < p2(0, e) − ∆. Since p2(0, e) ≤ pie, this
condition is implied by by the fact (5) is not satisfied. We have shown that therefore
there is no deviation in the first period.
Proposition 6
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2 except that the buyer has no private
information in the first period and believes his innovation is good with probability q. The
17Since the order is identical in the second period
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condition for signing in period 1 thus becomes
q(pi − pil) ≥ qp2(n)−∆
This is equivalent to
∆ ≥ ∆(n) = q(pil − pi + p2(n))
In Proposition 1 we established that p2(n) < pi − pil and thus ∆(n) < 0 for all values
of q and n.
Proposition 7
Second period
In the second period, the type of the inventor is known. The reservation price fixed by
the innovator is κ, her outside option. The unique equilibrium is such that all buyers bid
exactly their valuation (equilibrium bidding strategy in a second price auction). Thus in
the second period
p2(n) = pi(n)− cn2 (6)
where cn2 is the second lowest cost among n draws of the cost parameter.
First period
In the first period, the equilibrium is defined by:
• Bidding strategies for the buyers
• Reservation price r chosen by the good type innovator (bad type innovator always
sets zero reservation price in first period)
For a given reservation price r, we show that the unique equilibrium is such that a
player with cost c bids his valuation q[pi − c] if it is above r and bids zero if it is below.
If q[pi − c] < r, in equilibrium, the buyer bids zero. Indeed, any bid above q[pi − c]
would give a loss in expectation and any bid below is accepted only by the low type
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innovator since q[pi− c] < r. In what follows we show that in the case where q[pi− c] > r,
the unique equilibrium strategy is to bid the valuation q[pi − c].
We first note that, for a buyer with cost c, bids strictly above q[pi − c] are dominated
by bids equal to zero. We eliminate such strategies. After elimination of these strategies,
we show that bidding exactly q[pi − c] is a dominant strategy for a player with cost c.
Consider a bid b < q[pi − c]. There are three cases to be considered:
Case 1 bid b is the highest bid. In that case bidding q[pi − c] does not change the
outcome (outcome purely determined by the second highest bid).
Case 2 bid b is not the highest bid and the second highest bid is above the reservation
price r. We denote b1 the highest bid in that case. If b1 > q[pi − c] deviating to bidding
q[pi − c] has no effect. If b1 ≤ q[pi − c], the expected profits if a bid q[pi − c] is made is
q[pi − c]− b1 ≥ 0. Thus bidding q[pi − c] is preferable to bidding b that gives zero profits.
Case 3 bid b is not the highest bid and highest bid, denoted b1, is below the reservation
price (which means b1 ≤ q[pi− c]). The profits if the buyer bids q[pi− c] are q[pi− c]− b1 ≥
0.18 If pi− c is not the highest valuation among the n bidders, then the bidder would lose
the auction in period 2 and strictly prefers bidding q[pi−c] this period. If he has the highest
valuation, we denote pi − cn2 the second highest valuation. In the second period, if the
innovation is good he will win the auction and make profits pi−c−(pi−cn2). So, if he does
not deviate, his expected profits are q(cn2− c). If he deviates and bids q[pi− c], his profits
are q[pi − c]− b1. Since for a player with cost c, we eliminated the dominated strategy of
bidding strictly more than q[pi−c], we know that b1 ≤ q[pi−cn2]. So when he bids q[pi−c]
the bidder expects profits greater than q[pi − c]− b1 ≥ q[pi − c]− q[pi − cn2] > q[c− cn2].
We have therefore shown by elimination of weakly dominated strategies, that, for
any reservation price r, the unique equilibrium is such that a player with cost c bids his
valuation q[pi − c] if it is above r and bids zero if it is below.
We now show that if she runs an auction in the first period, the innovator chooses
a zero reservation price. If the second highest bid is below the reservation price, the
auction is run again in the next period. We note however that the incentives to wait are
higher when the valuations are higher. Indeed, given the strategies of the bidders in the
18We assume that as long as the highest bid is above the reservation price, the sale occurs at the
second highest bid, even if it is lower than the reservation price: assuming that the price paid is the
reservation price would not qualitatively change our results.
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first and second periods, if the second highest bid is b in the first period, then the second
highest bid would be b/q in the second (since in the first the players bid their valuation
times the probability the type is good). So the innovator should accept the first period
bid if:
b ≥ b
q
−∆⇔ b ≤ q
1− q∆
The incentives to wait are higher for higher valuations, so no reservation price is placed
(for low values the innovator wants to sell now).
In the first period the innovator has to decide whether or not to run an auction. Her
expected profit in an auction is q[pi−E[cn2]]. If she decides to wait for the second period
to conduct the auction, she expects profits pi−E[cn2]−∆ if she is a good type, and zero
otherwise. Thus a good innovator runs an auction in the first period if and only if
∆ ≥ (1− q)(pi − E[cn2])
As ∆ is known by all potential buyers, running an auction in the first period if this
condition is not satisfied signals a bad type innovator, and no buyer bids a positive price:
such a deviation is therefore not profitable.
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